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UTAH UTAH SUP~~ME CClJRt 
DOCUMENT 
KFU BRIEF 
45.9 
.S9 
DOCKET NO.----..---.. 
In the Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
ROSE GIBBONS and A. K. TIER-
NAN, 
Appellants, 
VS. 
R. G. FRAZIER and UTAH COP-
PER COMPANY, a Corporation, 
Respondents. 
APPELLANTS' BRIEF. 
The trial judge's remarks at the time his decision was 
announced appear in the Bill of Exceptions, and it will 
perhaps serve a double purpose to quote them at this 
time. It is a fair epitome of the issues. 
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THE COURT: Plaintiffs allege that they, with one 
Michael Gibbons and Stephen Hays, as tenants in com-
mon, own and are entitled to the possession of Lot 10, 
Block 4, Plat A, Wilkes Official Survey of Bingham 
Townsite in this county, being a part of McGuire & Com-
pany Placer, U. S. Lot 242, and that the same is wrong-
fully withheld by defendants, after demand therefor. 
Defendants deny that plaintiffs, with said Michael 
Gibbons and Sltephen Hays, or with any other person, 
as tenants in common, or at all, are or ever were entitled 
to possession of said pre-m:iSBs, or have or had any right 
or title therein; admit that they are in possession there-
of, and that they have refused, a£ter demand, to deliver 
possession to plaintiffs; allege ownership in fee simple in 
the defendant Utah Copper Company, and allege that the 
defendant Frazier is its tenant and in posession. They 
allege that they and their predecessors have occupied the 
premises for over twenty-five years, and paid all taxes 
thereon, and on the improvements thereupon, during the 
whole of said time, and they plead Sections 6449 and 6450, 
Compiled Laws of Utah, 1917, in bar of plaintiff's action, 
and set forth the history of their possession and their 
souree of title, and allege that between September, 1924, 
and April, 1925, they erected a hospital thereon at a cost 
of twenty-three thousand dollars; tha:,t their and their 
predecessors' possession was open, notorious and exelu-
sive, and under claim of title, and that with the knowledge 
of plaintiffs, they have on several occasions improved 
same and erected structures thereon, without notice from 
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plaintiffs that they claimed title thereto, until the notice 
served by plaintiffs October 30, 1924, after the building 
of the present structure thereon was under way, and that 
by said delays the plaintiffs are guilty of laches and are 
estopped now from claiming title thereto. 
The McGuire & Company Placer Claim was located 
August 26, 1875. Notice of location was not recorded 
until about four and a half years later, and United States 
patent issued thereon July 20, 1881, and the patent was 
not recorded until nearly sixteen years later, June 12, 
1897. By conveyances therefrom, the plaintiffs, and their 
associates acquire title thus alleged by them. 
The Valentine patent, so-called, to Location "E ", 
No. 227, for forty acres, was acquired by David H. Bent-
ley, by United States patent dated July 10, 1876, andre-
corded on the 25th of that month. 
The two patents are in conflict and Lot 10, Block 4, 
Plat A, in controversy herein, is within the conflict area. 
In 1900 the County Surveyor made a survey of Bing-
ham Townsite, which was approved in 1904, and from this 
survey we get the description in the complaint, and taxes 
were thereafter levied by the County Assessor with refer-
ence to the descriptions made from that plat. 
Plaintiffs paid taxes on the McGuire & Company pat-
ent from 1900 to the present time. The valuation was 
usually placed at thirty dollars up to 1916. lti was sixty 
dollars in 1908, fifty-five dollars in 1916, sixty dollars in 
1917, thirty dollars in 1918, and has remained at sixty 
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dollars since that time. The defendants and their prede-
cessors paid the taxes on the other patent area at least 
from 1897 to date, and separately on Lot 10, Block 4, 
Plat A, £rom 1900 to date. From 1896 to 1899, inclusive, 
it was assessed as fifty by one one hundred feet and im-
provements. In 1895 the taxes were paid simply on '' 1 
Frame House.'' 
Both claimants acquire title from conveyances found-
ed on a United States patent, both have paid taxes as-
sessed against the property, and the defendants, and their 
predecessors have been in possession of the particular 
lot described. 
The testimony shoWring that one Maxwell went into 
possession of the lot in 1878 or 1880, and remaining then~ 
until he sold to Dr. Straup in May, 1899. As to just when 
he enclosed the lot, there is no evidence, and the fact 
that Maxwell paid taxes only on the house in 1895, would 
probably preclude any finding of adverse possession prior 
to 1896, but from that time on, they were assessed and 
paid and the property was enclosed, that is, their bound-
aries indicated by an enclosure from about that time. 
If the question in this case involved only the property 
rights acquired under the patents, the Court might be in-
clined to the opinion maintained by the plaintiffs, that is, 
that the placer patent related back to the original loca-
tion and established prioriy, but the adverse possession 
on the part of the defendants is so clearly established that 
the case must be determined on that question. 
Two cases have already been tried and appealed to 
the Supreme Court and .settled by that tribunal on this 
identical question and these have been cited in defend-
ants' brief .and are binding on this court. 
Judgment must be for the defendants, no cause of 
action. 
It will be noted that Judge "Wight at that time seemed 
to feel that the defense of adverse possession controlled 
the case. He intimated that his inclination was to hold 
that the mineral patent gave a superior title over the ag-
ricultural patent, although the latter had issued prior in 
time. He did not see fit to express his views respecting 
the defense of estoppel. However, the Court's formal 
findings of fact and conclusions ·of law squarely de~er­
mined the case in favor of the defendants on each defense 
pleaded in their answer. That is to say: (1) The Court 
finds that the agricultural patent passed a superior title 
to the mineral patent; (2) the Court finds on the defense 
of adverse possession in favor of the defendants; (3) the 
Court finds the defense of estoppel in their favor. 
\V" e now address our argument in that sequence. 
I. 
The McGuire & Company Placer Mining Claim was 
!ocated August 26, 1875, and United States patent issued 
thereon July 20, 1881. It is the appellants' contention 
that the issuance of that patent was a conclusive adjud1-
cation by duly constituted authority that in the cliseovNy 
of the mining c:laim, in its location and in all matters 
precedent to its issuance the owners of the mining claim 
had complied with the law. There is in truth no authority 
to the contrary and abundant authority in support of 
that contention. 
The appellants further contend that the authorilic>s 
are unanimous in holding that the title derived by patent 
to a mining claim relates back to the inception of the 
right, i. e., to the diseovery and location, and that in ccn-
~equence the appellants' title initiated as of the dale of 
the location of the McGuire Plaeer, to-wit: Aug·L~st ~G, 
1875. 
On F'ebruary 9, 1876, s1x mouths aftt-r the 1:uumg 
elaim had been duly loeated, one Bentley made entry in 
the local Land Offiee and deposited Valentine Scrip to 
apply on the purchase of the west half of th0 east half 
of the northwest quarter of Section 26, asserting that it 
was non-mineral ground. 
It is of eourse true that there is no provision in the 
mining laws for the recordation of mining locations in 
any office of the Department of the Interior. Hucl the 
law been different in that respect, it may very well be that 
the Department would not have entertained Bentley's 
applieation. Or, if the law had provicled for notice and 
hearing on Bentley's applieation so that the owners of 
the mining claim might have had their clay in conrt to 
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adverse or protest, the present controversy might have 
been determined and be res adjudicata between the par-
ties to this appeal long since, but again such is not the 
law. 
On July 10, 1876, or nearly five years before the 
patent to the McGuire Placer issued, patent issued to 
Bentley on his said entry. To a certain extent the area 
embraced in the two patents conflicts and unfortunately 
the demanded premises in this action lie within the con-
flict area. 
That these plaintiffs have the right to maintain eject-
ment without joining their co-tenants, Stephen Hays and 
Michael Gibbons, is not challenged and indeed it ought 
not to be. See Sections 6509 and 6511, Compiled Laws of 
Utah, 1917, and Moulton vs. McDermott (Cal.), 22 Pac. 
296. 
In view of the admitted ouster and demand, the plain-
tiffs' case in chief was made by pr:oving record title from 
original source. The abstract of title, plaintiffs' Exhibit 
"A", clearly establishes title in the plaintiffs to the Mc-
Guire & Company Placer, U.S. Lot 242. 
A photostatic copy of the patent issued to Bentley on 
the Valentine Scrip entry is in evidence as defendants' 
Exhibit 16. 
For the convenience of the Court, we here print the 
Act of Congress, approved April 5, 1872, under which 
the so-called Valentine Scrip came into being. 
Be It Enacted by Uw SL•nate and House of Representa-
tives of the United States of America, In Congress 
Assembled: 
That the ninth circuit court of the UnitPd States, of 
California, be, and hereby is, author1~r.ed aml required to 
hear and decide upon the merits, the claim of Thomas B. 
Valentine, claiming title, under a :Mexican grant to J'uan 
Miranda, to a place called the Rancho Arroyo de San 
.Antonio, situated in the County of Sonoma and State of 
California in the same manner, and with the same juris-
diction, as if the claim to the said tract of land had been 
duly presented to the board of land commissioners um]Pr 
the provision of the act entitled, "An act to af"certain and 
settle private land claims in tlie State of California," ap-
proved March third, eighteen hundred fifty-one and an 
appeal had been dt1ly taken from their decision to thP 
district court of California by the said Thomas B. V a] en-
tine. 
Section 2. That on the said hearing any testimony 
heretofore taken before the said board of connnissiouen~. 
in relation to said claim on behalf of tlte said claimant, 
or the United States, may be read, suhject to all ;just ex-
reptions to its competency; and additional testimony, on 
Pither part, may be taken, under the order and direetion 
of said circuit court, as to the validity and extent of said 
daim. 
Section 3. That an appeal sball be taken from 1 he 
final decision and decree of the said circuit eourt to tlw 
Supreme Court of the United States, by either party. in 
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accordance with the provisions of the tenth section of 
said act of March third, eighteen hundred fifty-one, with-
in six months after the rendition of such final decision; 
and a decree under the provisions of this act, in favor of 
~aid claim, 'Shall not affect any adverse right or title t(l 
the lands described in said decree; but in lieu thereof, the 
claimant, or his legal representatives, may select, and 
shall be allowed, patents for an equal quantity of the 
unoccupied and unappropriated public lands of the 
United States, not mineral, and in tracts not le'Ss than the 
subdivisions provided for in the United States land laws, 
and, if unsurveyed when taken, to conform, when sur-
veyed to the general ·system of United S.tates land sur-
veys ; and the Commissioner of the General Land Office, 
under the direction of the Secretary of the Interior, shull 
be authorized to issue scrip in legal subdivisions, to the 
~aid Valentine, or his legal representatives, in aecord-
ance with the provisions of this act: PROVIDED~ that 
110 deeree in favor of the said Valentine shall be executed 
nor be of any force or effect against any person or per-
Eons; nor shall land scrip or patents issue as hereinbefore 
provided, unless the ·said Valentine shall first execute and 
deliver to the Commissioner of the General Land Office 
:~. deed conveying to the United States, all his right, title 
and interest to the lands covered by the said Miranda 
grant. 
Approved April 5, 1872. 
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rrhe proof shows that by mesne conveyances from th<' 
patentee, Bentley's title, such as may be, became [,odgecl 
in Stephen Hays prior to 1904. 
The basis of the defendants' claim of reconl title or 
title from original source is a deed from Hays to McCann 
of October :3, 1904. 
Lest confusion nwy arise, it should be noted, t!Jat 
while it is conceued by all parties that Stephen llays \\·~~-'' 
at the time of the commencement of this action a p;trt 
ovvner of the McGuire Placer, lw did 11ot acqaire th:1t in-
terest until 1913. In 1904, when he gave his quit-clailtl 
deed to Charles .McCann, Hays had no title to thP ~fe­
Guire Placer and all he purported to convey to MC'Cnnn 
was a portion of the Valentine Scrip patellt. 
So far as record title or title from origiual son ret• i •; 
concerned, the claims of tlw respeetive p:H'tit•s lWl~· he 
stated as follows: 
The location of the mining claim was several lllOPths 
prior to the time Bentley, the holder of th0 ~;l'rip. made 
bis filing in the Land Office. The date of location ol' t1w 
mining claim is July 26, 1875, whereas tlw date of Bent-
h~y 's agricultural entry is February 9, 1876; six or se\'l·ll 
months later. However, patent issued to Bentley .July 
10, 1876, whereas patent did not issue to the MeClu"rp 
Placer until July 30, 1R81. rrhe dPfendants' contention 
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1:; that the agricultural patent to Bentley antedating by 
five years the mineral patent to the McGuire Placer is 
sl.1perior to the mineral patent. The claim of the plain-
tiffs is that tlwir title initiated by the discovery and lo-
cation of the mining claim in 1875, seven months before 
tl;e agricultural entry; that the subsequent issuance or 
patent to the mining claim in 1881 evidences the faet that 
the title initiated by the discovery and location in 1876 
is valid, and that being so title passed out of the Uu; 1 c>d 
States as of July 26th, 1875, with the result that ~when 
the agricultural patent issuerl to Bentley in 1876, the 
United Stat~)S 'had theretofore by solemn Congressinnal 
Act divested itself of the right to convey tWe to Brmtley, 
so far at least as the two estates conflict. 
To recapitulate: 
The date of the discovery and location of th(' :Me-
Guire Placer is July 26, 1875. 
rl1 lw date• of the agricultural entry IS February 9, 
187G. 
rrhe date of the agricultural patent is July 10, ] 876. 
'l'h(• date of the mineral patent is July 30, 1881. 
In support of their contention that the agricultural 
patent so prior in time of issuance must be superior to 
the sub::equent mineral patent, defendants argue that tl!i• 
agricultural patent ex proprio vigore passed title ont of 
the United States in 1876, that in conE>equcnce thl~ later 
J>~ineral patent conld pass nothing, that the agrienltural 
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patent is, under the authorities, not subject to collateral 
attack but is a conclusive adjudication against all pri-
vate parties by the duly constituted agency of the govern-
ment (the General Land Office), that the land in question 
was not mineral in character, was subject to entry by 
Bentley and that all conditions preliminary and necessary 
existed at and prior to the issuance ,of patent in order to 
vest fee simple title in the patentee. 
Of course, everything that can be said in respect to 
the immunity of the agricultural patent from collat-
<·ral attack can also be said and has frequently been said 
respecting mineral patents, and of course, in this case we 
do have a mineral patent in the patent to the McGuire 
& Company Placer; so right there, on this branch of the 
case, the issue is clearly drawn. Is the controlling p1·i-· 
ority the date of discovery and location of the mining 
claim on which a patent finally issued or is it the dat<> of 
the issuance of the agricultural patent? 
By the mineral land laws, public lands containing val-
uable mineral deposits are open to exploration, occupancy 
and acquisition; and as an inducement to effective explor-
ation the discoverer is given the right to locate a substan-
t,ial area embracing his discovery and to hold the same 
and extract minerals without payment of rent or royalty 
so long as he puts $100.00 worth of labor or improve-
ments upon the claim each year, and is also given the 
right to demand and receive a patent at a small sum per 
acre after he puts $500.00 worth of labor or Improve-
ments upon the claim. 
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The discovery of minerals is the important thing and 
it is the discoverer who is the object of the Government's 
bounty. The provisions respecting location and the ig-
i'Uance of patent are to large extent ministerial and are 
found in the statutes rather for the purpose of providing 
orderly procedure and recordation, defining rights ac-
quired by discover·y tlian that in and of themselves the 
location or patent issued thereon initiates title. 
And so it ha:.s been consistently and universally held 
at all times and in all courts since the passage of thH Act 
of Congress of .July 1866, that the rights of a mineral 
claimant initiate and attach by virtue ofhis discovery of 
mineral in the public lauds and. that the rights so attach-
ing are acquired by the Act of Congress itself, that the 
Act of Congress itself is his muniment of title, and that 
the patent subsequently acquired "adds but little to his 
security.'' 
It becomes necessary therefore to define the rights 
aequired by the discoverer as a result of his discov?ry 
of minerals in the public lands and as Mr. Lindley says: 
"The decisions of the C'ourts, both state and federal, an~ 
quite harmonious.'' 
Prior to the issuance of patent, the locator caanot 
be said to own the fee simple title in its broadest sense 
although, as has been stated, by virtue of the fact of dis-
c·overy and location anrl from the very time of discovery, 
the discoverer by tlle terms of the Congressional Act it-
self acquires a certain estate. The fee simple title, resid-
ing in the government, passes only at the time of sale and 
payment of the purchase price by the locator-in other 
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words at the time of final entry and payment into the local 
land office of the statutory price per acre. It is the p J.t-
ent which follows that evidence the fee simple title then 
~md thereby acquired. In the meantime, however, be-
tween the time of discovery and issuance of patent, by 
virtue of the Act of Congress the locator has acquired 
a right and it has been said that the naked legal fee sim-
ple title is held during that time by the Government in 
trust for the locator to be conveyed to him upon his ap-
plication and after compliance by him with the terms pre-
scribed by the mineral land laws. Lindley, 3d Edition, 
Section 539, top of page 1201. 
The Government having declared that mineral lands 
are free and open to exploration and purchase and a posi-
tive compact having been made by the Government with 
the discoverer and locator, whereby the latter upon com-
pliance with the law is clothed with the ex-clusive right 
of possession and enjoyment, the locator of a mining 
claim is given a higher estate than is g-iven the settler or 
locator under any other land laws. And if the govern-
ment after a valid mining location has been made could 
deprive the locator of his rights, his right of possession 
certainly would not be "exclusive." And the result is, 
as Mr. Lindley says in the Third Edition of his work, 
Section 542 at page 1209: "that the government itself 
cannot deprive the locator of rights accrued under the 
mining laws has we think been fully demonstrated." 
We remark in passing and parenthetically that if the 
contention of the defendants can prevail then the court 
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would permit these defendants to do something which the 
g'overnment of the United States itself could not do. 
\Yith reference to the character of the estate held by 
a mining locator, we might fill a volume with quotations 
from the decided cases, but we assume that Mr. Lindley's 
epitome found in Section 539 of his Third Edition will 
suffice; .and it appears therefrom thnt the character of 
the estate held by the locator (not by virtue of any patent 
but prior to the issuance of patent and after discovery) is 
by virtue of the Act of Congress itself, which in and of 
itself is a muniment of title of highest dignity and solem-
nity and has been described and defined as follows: 
It is property in the highest sense of that term which 
may be bought, sold and conveyed and will pass by des-
eent. 
It is vendible, inheritable and taxable. 
It is a legal estatE' ·of freehold. 
It has the effect of a grant of the right of present and 
exclusive possession of the lands located. 
It is in its nature real estate. Although the locator 
may obtain a patent, his patent adds but little to his Sf'-
curity. 
The owner of a location is entitled to the exclusive 
possession and enjoyment against everyone, including the 
United States itself. 
The area becomes segregated from the public domain 
and becomes the property of the locator. 
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The general government itself cannot abridge the 
rights of the miner. His rights have become vested and 
the government may not destroy those rights. 
And finally at the top of page 1204 of said Section 
539, the author says: 
''The doctrine hereinbefore enunciated has 
never been seriously questioned. It has been reit-
erated in many cases in both the state and federal 
courts.'' 
We do not anticipate that what we have said imme-
diately above will be challenged by counsel for the re-
spondents. But they have contended that there must be 
some point in time when the character of land must be 
finally determined; and, for the interests of all concerned, 
there can be no better point to determine that question 
than at the time of issuing the patent; that a patent upon 
its face should either grant or not grant and that it must 
be seen from a construction of the language of the patent 
itself whether anything is granted or not and if anything 
be granted what it is; that there is no authority to issue 
a patent which in effect only says: If the lands herein 
described 1hereafter turn out to be agricultural land then 
I grant them, but if they turn out to be mineral land, then 
I do not grant them; that such a patent would be so un-
certain that it would be impossible to determine from the 
face of the patent whether anything is granted or not. 
And so counsel argued and cited to the trial court de-
cisions from various courts, from the Supreme Court 
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~f the United States down to the Supreme Court of the 
then Territory of Utah, to the effect that a patent of the 
United States is not subject to collateral attack but is in 
and of itself conclusive (at least in actions at law) of all 
matters of fact necessary to its issue. 
As to t1hat, the following three propositions may be 
deduced from the decided cases: 
1. A patent is conclusive against eollateral attack 
between rival claimants when a patentee has a vested 
right in the property in question by virtue of his patent, 
and his adversary seeking to assail the patent had no 
vested right at the time of patent. 
2. A patent is conclusive against collateral attack 
between rival claimants when eaeh had a elaim to the 
property in question, known and recognized by the law, 
before the patent issued and the patent issued only after 
a hearing wherein each claimant had his day in court and 
opportunity to establish his alleged claim. 
3. ~Where a property rig1ht has vested in one person, 
prior to the issuance of a patent to another person, and 
no provision is made by the laws for a hearing wherein 
the merits of the respective claims might be determined, 
if the Land Office nevertheless assumes to issue patent, 
it in so doing is acting outside its jurisdiction and the 
patent is void and there is no room for invoking tlhe doc-
trine that the patent is conclusive against collateral at-
track. 
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The case of Ferry v. Street, 4; Utah 521, is a typical 
case falling within the first proposition, supra. 
In the Ferry case the grantee of the patentee brought 
ejectment against the defendant and proved the issuance 
of patent and conveyance from the patentee to the plain-
tiff. The defendant admitted his ouster but set up no 
recognized rig·ht to the land in himself. Apparently the 
defendant relied on the maxim that the plaintiff in eject-
ment must prevail on the strength of his own title and 
not on the weakness of lhis adversary's title. It appeared 
that the defendant was nothing but a ''squatter'' and had 
theretofore initiated no claim to the land under any known 
or recognized procedure; nevertheless the defendant 
claimed that the patent had wrongfully issued to the 
plaintiff's predeces~ors and that therefore the plaintiff 
must fail. The defendant asserted that the patent ought 
not to have issued because as a matter of fact the land 
involved was mineral land at the time the patent issued. 
But the court said in effect that that contention, if it ever 
could be made, could arise only in a controversy between 
the patentee and the government or some real party in 
interest prior to tihe issuance of patent; that Congress 
had delegated to the Land Department jurisdiction to de-
termine as between the applicant for a patent and the 
government all facts necessary to be determinerl hefore 
issuance of patent, including the question whether or not 
the land in controversy was mineral or not mineral; that 
in that controversy, if any existed, the defendant had no 
concern whatever; that he was an outsider and had done 
nothing to establish any right in the property in any way 
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which the law recognized. And se> the court announced 
the doctrine that inasmuch .as the only parties in interest 
/had .had th~ir rights determined before a competent trib-
unal resulting in the issuance of patent, that the patent 
was conclusive as between the real parties in interest 
and l110 'outsider could be heard to assert that that adjudi-
cation w.as wrong. 
And to the same effeet, in St. Louis Smelting & Re-
fining Company v. Green, 13 Ped. 208, the ~ourt quotes 
the 'Supreme C-ourt of the United States as follows~ 
"It does not lie in the moutlh of a stranger to 
the title to -coni-plain of the act of the government 
with respect to it. If the ,government ~s dissatis-
ned, it .can, ~n its own account, authorize ;proceed-
ings to va.cate the :patent or limit its operation.'' 
And again in Horsky v. Moran, 53 Pac. 1064, the Su-
preme Court of Montana said: 
''By his answer he shows that he has long 
since disconnected himself from the United Stntes 
government, stands in no privity with it, and pos-
sesses no claim, legal or equitable, to the lotE. which 
plaintiff has openly, notoriously and continuously 
oeeupi<ed for over 20 years. Defendant is without 
any title or clhain of title at all. He is in the atti-
tude of an intruder, MJ.d it does not lie in his mouth 
to be he:ard to assail the plaintiff's position. Bo-
hall v, Dilla, 114 U. S. 50, 5 Su.p. C~ 182;'·' 
As to the second proposition, supra, the mining laws 
provide for the so-called adverse suit between rival min-
eral claimants. An applicant for a mineral patt>nt must 
20 
issue notice to the entire world of his claim and applica-
tion for patent. Thereupon any other mineral claimant 
may object and advance his claims to the territory in 
question and have the merits finally determined in a court 
of competent jurisdiction. Of course, th·~ questions in-
volved are res adjudicata after a trial or, if a rival claim-
ant fails to adverse when given opportunity, he may not 
afterwards challenge the patent. However, it should be 
always borne in mind that there is no provision for an 
adverse suit except as between rival mineral claimants. 
"717. Section 2305 of the Revised Statutes 
only contemplates adverse proceedings as between 
rival mineral claimants to the land, and does not 
!have in view a settlement of the character of the 
land as between mineral and agricultural claim-
ants." 
Lindley on Mines, 3rd Ed., p. 1755. 
The case at bar falls under the third proposition, su-
pra, and the reason for it is well stated by J-udge San-
born in Uinta Tunnel Min. & Transp. Co. v. Creede & 
Cripple Creek Min. & Mill. Co., 119 Fed. 164, 167: 
''A judgment is binding upon the parties to 
the proceeding in which it is rendered and upon 
their privies. The parties to the judgments of 
tlhe land department by which it allowed the entries 
of the lode claims in the case of the gold mining 
company were the United States and the owners 
of those claims. No other parties had or claimed 
any interest in the land at the time those entries 
were made. The judg1nents and the patents ac-
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cordingly bound and estopped these parties and 
their subsequent assignees. They estopped all 
parties who initiated claims upon or interests in 
the lands under either of the parties to the pro-
ceeding subsequent to the judgments of the land 
department. The claimant of tlhe tunnel site in 
that case initiated its claim under the United 
States one of the parties to that proceeding subse-
quent to the judgments. It was therefore a privy 
of the United States, and was estopped by the 
judgments of the land department from proving 
that no discoveries had been made upon the lode 
claims before these judgments were rendered. 
Thris is not the -case in the action before us. 
The judgments of the land department allowing 
the entries were rendered on August 5, 1892. At 
that time there were three parties interested in 
the land, the lode claimants, the United States and 
the claimant of the tunnel site. Two of these par-
ties, the lode claimants and the United States, 
were parties to the proceedings, and were es-
topped by the judgments and the patents. One of 
them was not a party to any of these proceedings, 
to the judgments, or to the patents, and~ upon 
familiar principles was neitlher bound by them 110r 
estopped by them from presenting and proving ac-
cording to the established rules of evidence in 
trials under the common law the fact that no dis-
coveries had been made on the lode claims before 
the location of its tunnel site, the fact essential 
to the validity of its claim upon and interest in 
the land." 
By t~1e following decisions the appellants' conten-
tion that the patent issued on the l\fcGuire Placer gives 
title paramount to the agricultural patent is full.'r sus-
tained. 
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'' * "" "' A valid location of a quartz lode 
mining claim on the public mineral lands of the 
United States is a grant from the government to 
the locator thereof, and carries with it the right, 
by a compliance witlh the law, of obtaining a full 
and complete title to all the lands included within-
the boundaries of the claim, which by the location 
are withdrawn from sale or pre-emption; and the 
patent, when issued, relates back to the location, 
and is not a distinct grant, but the consummation 
of the grant which had its inception in the loca-
tion ,of the claim." 
-Butte City Smokehouse Lode Cases, 6 
Mont. 397, 401, 12 Pac. 858. 
"If then, the location of a mining claim has 
the effect of a grant by the United States to the: 
locator of the right to the present and exclusive 
possession of the ground located, it foHows that 
there could not be a like grant of the same prop-
erty, to any other person. There would be no 
room for a further grant; for the government 
would have nothing further to convey. After such 
a grant, which also carries witih it the right to 
purchase the abso!lute title, the land described 
within the grant ceases to be public land, and the 
pre-emption laws, and laws providing for the sale 
and purchase of the public domain, have no appli-
cation to it 'Or effect upon it. It is just as much 
wi1fudrawn from the public domain as the fee is by 
a valid grant from the United States under au-
thority, or the possession by a valid and subsist-
ing homestead or pre-emption entry. It is already 
sold, and becomes private property, which may be: 
disposed of at the will of the owner. And so land 
thus so:ld and disposed of is not affected one way 
or another by the subsequent acts of congress pro-
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viding for the entry of townsites upon the public 
lands. The application and entry for (non-min-
eral lands) is only authorized on the public lands; 
and after the lands have been granted and sold, 
AS IN THE CASE OF A VALID MINING LO-
CArL'ION AND CLAIM, the entry of a (non-min-
eral claimant) does not affect such claim though 
Rituate within the boundaries of the same. The 
reason is that the mining claim and ground has 
already been granted and sold and has thereby 
c·eascd to be a portion of the public lands for 
which only the (non-mineral) entry could be 
1nade. f.' * * '' 
-Silver Bow M. & Nl. Co. v. Clark, 5 Mont. 
378, 415; 5 Pac. 570. 
''A valid !oration is equivalent to a contract 
of purchase. The right to occupy and purchase 
means the right to acquire a full title. The min-
eral lands are declared open to occupation and 
purchase. Th(c~ location, together with the neces-
sary work, is the purchase, and the patent is the 
evidence of the title so acquired. The location, 
therefore, has the effect of a grant from the gov-
ernment to the locator; and this grant cannot be 
defeated or abridged by an unauthorized excep-
tion contained in the patent, for the patent must 
always be in accordance with and the consumma-
tion of the grant evidenced by a valid location. 
-Talbot v. King, 6 Mont. 76, 9 Pac. 434. 
Commcn~1g on th~~ foregoing statements of the law, 
the Supreme Court of the Unitt~d S.tatcs has the follow-
ing to Ray: 
''In the several cases to which we have been 
refnrrc>d in the fifth and sixth Montana Reports 
(:\filling Co. v. Olark, 5 Mont. 378, 5 Pac. Rep. 570; 
Talbott v. King, 6 Mont. 76, 9 Pac. Rep. 434; Butte> 
City Smokehouse Lode Cases, 6 Mont. 397,.12 Pac. 
Rep. 858), which involved contests between par-
ties claiming under mining patents and others 
claiming under town-site patents, and in which 
very able and learned opinions were given by tlte 
Supreme Court of the territory of Montana, t~he 
mining claims patented had been located and the 
rights of the mining claimant had thus attached 
before the town-site patent was issued. The pat-
ent which subsequently followed was a mere per-
fection of the right orit,rinated by the location, and 
to which it took effect by re 1lation. It was held, 
in accordance with this opinion, that the prior 
mining location was not affected by the townsite 
entry." 
Davis v. "Wiebold, 139 U.S. 507, 11 Sup. Ct. 
Rep. 628, 636. 
If an_v doubt can be entertained that the foregoing 
authorities must be limited in application to controver-
sies between a mineral claimant and a elaimant under a 
townsite entry any such doubt must be removed by th() 
holding of the Supreme Court in the case of Noyes v. 
Mantle, 127 U. S. 348, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1132. In that ease 
the controversy "\Vas brtween a prior lode location a11d a 
subsequent placer patent and the Supreme Court says, rt>-
ferring to the prior lode location: 
"There is no pretense in this case that the 
original locators did not eomply with all the re-
quirements of the law in making the location of 
the Pay Streak lode mining claim or that the claim 
was ever abandoned or forfeited. They were the 
discoverers of the claim. They marked its boun-
daries by stakes, so that they could be readily 
traced. They posted the required notice~ which 
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was duly recorded in compliance wjth the regula-
tions of the district. They had thns done all that 
was necessary under the la>v for the acquisition of 
an exc1lusive right to the possession and enjoyment 
of the ground. T,he claim was thenceforth their 
property. They needed only a patent of the United 
States to render their title perfect, and that they 
could obtain at any time upon proof of what they 
had done in locating the claim, and of :subsequent 
expenditures to a specified amount in developing 
it. Until the patent issued, the government held 
the title in trust for the locators or tl.eir vendees. 
The ground itself 1oas not afterwards open to sale. 
The location having become completed in April, 
1878, antedates by some months the application of 
the defendant for a patent for his placer claim.'' 
''As said in Belk v. Meagher, 104 U. S. 279, 
283: 'A mining claim perfected under the law is 
property in the highest sense of that term, which 
may be bought, sold, and eonveyed, and will pass 
by descent.' It is not, therefore, subject to the 
disposal of the government." 
And then after defining a lode "known to exist" t\O 
far as a placer patent is concerned, the court condudes 
its opinion with the following language: 
"At any rate, as already stated, it could not 
convey property which had already passed to oth-
ers. A patent of the government cannot, any 
more H1an a deed of an individual, transfer what 
the grantor does not possess.'' 
If the foregoing is the law (and under the authorities 
there would seem to be no doubt about it) when only a 
mining location-not yet gone to patent-is involved ho""\1' 
much stronger is the case in behalf of the McGuire Placer 
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which did in fact g·o to patent. In that respect the Smoln·-
house Lode Cases and tlJe case of Davis v. Wiebold, 
supra, announce the rule : 
''In the case of Sparks v. Pierce, 115 U. S. 
412, S. C. 6 Sup. Ct. 'Rep. 102, it is said that a pat-
ant to a mineral claim is itself evidence that all 
the requirements of the law for its sale have been 
complied with. 
And so the Smokehouse patent was itself evi-
dence that, in the discovery, the location of the 
claim, and in all proceedings up to the issuance of 
the patent, the law had been complied with. The 
Smokehouse location was known to exist before the 
town-site entry. This patent related hack to the 
location in 1875, and fixes the mineral character 
of the claim at that time, and at all subsequent 
times, up to the date of the issuance of the pat-
ent in 1881. It was, therefore a valid mining 
claim and possession in 1877, when the townsite 
patent was issued, and necessarily excepted 
therefrom.'' 
II. 
ADVERSE POSSESSION. 
For the court's convenience, we tabulate the sequence 
of the alleged occupancy : 
Maxwell until May 26, 1899. 
Dr. Straup, May 26, 1899 to May 8, 1901. 
Charles McCann, May 8, 1901, to Octobrr 5, 
1904. 
27 
Dr. Castleman, October 5, 1904, to March 30, 
1907. 
Dr. C. N. Ray, March 30, 1907, to June 30, 
1913. 
Dr. Davison H. Ray and Dr. O'Brien, June 
30, 1913, to April19, 1917. 
Dr. Davison H. Ray, April 19, 1917, to June 
26, 1920. 
Elizabeth K. Ray, June 26, 1920, to Novem-
ber 21, 1922. 
Dr. Frazier, November 21, 1922, to Septem-
ber 20, 1924. 
Utah Copper Company, September 20, 1924, 
to date. 
It appears from the only testimony offered on the 
subject that Maxwell went into possession under permis-
sion from John McGuire, one of the owners of the min-
ing claim (Abs. 50, 'rrans. 81), and from time to time in 
the succeeding years recognized the paramount title. He 
approached Gibbons at least twice in e:ff:ort to acquire 
title. (Abs. 49, Trans. 77.) In the case of Central Pac. 
Ry. Co. vs. Tarpey, 51 Utah 107-121, the following ru1e 
was approved and adopted: 
''The possession of one who recognizes or ad-
mits title in another either by declaration or con-
duct, is not adverse to the title of such other until 
such occupant has changed the character of his 
possession either by express declaration or by 
the exercise of actual ownership inconsistent with 
a suboruina te character." 
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Again D.r. Straup was never in actual posse:ssion of 
the demanded premises adversely or otherwise. The wit-
ness BomregaiPd so testified (.Abs. 39, Trans. 25), and so 
did Dr. Straup himself at the commencement :of his cross-
examination. (.Abs. 42, Trans. 36.) 
The period -of adverse possession cannot therefore 
eGmmenre prrio·r to May 8, 1.901, when Dr. Straup sold to 
McCann. Furthermore the proof as to payment of taxes 
on any land commences with the year 1896. In 1895 taxes 
were assessed against "1 frame house" .and no more. \Ve 
mention the circumstance, but do not dwell upon it, that 
for the years 1896-1899 (defendants' Exhibits 43-40, Ahs. 
31), the property .assessed was merely described as '' 50x 
100 feet Bingham.'' It was announced in Fare£ v. Urban, 
46 Utah 609, that ·where both parties _produce tax receipts 
and the description is vague in the receipts produced by 
the adverse claimant, he must fail. 
It is oonoeded by the resp.ondents that their proof 
fails entirely to show payment of any taxes whatsoever 
for the year 1902. 'rhe puoof does show that taxes as-
sest>ed f@lr :the year 1920 were not paid when due, but sale 
was made tD the county. The fact that redemption was 
made does not satisfy the statute. 
''But, though the redemption had been ef-
fected while :he was still ;in posseSBion claiming 
title, it wou1d not have .bwn a -compliance with 
tthe -law. If there is anything of "benefit to the 
i!tate contemplated by this anomalous law, it is 
.that it will have a tendency to induce people to 
pay their taxeR, ·and not compel the state to take 
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the title slilbjeet to redemption. If it is an ele-
ment in the adverse possession .Wnding to show 
good faith, .certainly during those years in which 
the taxes have not been paid the possession lacl{!S 
an essential element required in the statute. Dur-
ing aU the y-ears in which the 'delinquency was a~­
lowed, the tr:u1e owner might forbear suit because 
of his knowledge that the person in possession had 
not paid taxes, thereby indicating that he was not 
holding advers~ly.'' 
M.eDona,ld v. McCoy, 121 Cal. 55, 53 Pa·c. 
421,426. 
It is a matter ·of commc,m knowledge that any 
-str.ang€r to the title, not necessarily the owner or an agent 
foT the owner of pToperty, can go to the County Treas-
urer and pay the taxes on any piece of property he cares 
to designate and the treas.urer will take his money and 
give him -a receipt. {)If ;Course, if a person has a receipt 
in his possession there is a P'resumption that he paid thf: 
taxes evidenced thereby. But the defendants' proof of 
payment of taxes in this case is not that. The defendants 
introduced nothing but duplicate receipt's obtained from 
the treasurer a week or so before the trial. Such dupli-
cate receipts are doubtless evidence that the property de-
scribed therein was atlseS'sed to the owner or claimant 
named therein. They a:re doubtless eviclenee that the 
taxes desoribed therein were in fact paid by somebody. 
But obviously th€-y ·:a.re not eVidence of payment by any 
particular person. 
''As to Payment of Taxes. Where payment 
of taxes is made an element of adverse possession 
there is no presumption that the claimant has paid 
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them but he must show this fact; nor does any 
presumption of payment arise from the fact that 
the taxes were assessed to the claimant and no 
default in payment was shown.'' 
2 Corpus Juris, Title "Adverse Posses-
sion,'' Section 596. 
"If any taxes were 'levied and assessed' 
(such are the words of the statute) * ,. * the 
defendant must show that he or his grantors paid 
them to establish his adverse possession. It is im-
material to whom they were assessed. Whether 
assessed to him or to some other person, if he does 
not show that he or his grantors have paid them, 
he cannot make out his adverse possession. It will 
not be enough for defendant to prove that he has 
paid aU the taxes levied and assessed on the land 
owned by him in the county where the land in suit 
is situated; for the defense of the statute of limi-
tations admits that he does not ovvn the land unless 
by reason of his adverse possession, and the ad-
verse possess~on is to be made out by this show-
ing.'' 
Ross v. Evans, 4 Pac. 443 (Cal. 1884). 
The only two witnesses produced by the defendants 
vvho testified to the payment of taxes during any Sf~ven­
year period of occupancy were Dr. Castleman and Dr. 
C. N. Ray. The seven-year period on which the deferd-
ants can rely must therefore be between October 5, 1904, 
and June 30, 1913. It is true that on direct examniation 
Dr. Castleman testified that he had paid the taxes d11r-
ing his occupancy, but we quote from his cross examina-
tion: 
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"Q. You testified in answer to Mr. Parsons, 
I believe, that you paid taxes on this lot which we 
designate as Lot 10, Block 41 
A. I believe I did, yes. 
Q. Have you any recollection, of doing it 
Doctor~ 
A. No distinct recol1lection such as writing 
out a check or receiving a tax notice and remit-
ting the money, no. I have no such reeollection 
as that. 
Q. Have you any definite recollection of re-
ceiving any tax notices~ 
A. No, I cannot picture any tax notice.'' 
Dr. Ray's testimony was substantially to the same 
effect. 
But it is not necessary to resolve a conflict in the tes· 
timony of these witnesses because on this branch of the 
case it can be determined on admitted facts as a matter 
of law. It must be admitted that Lot 10, Block 4 of 
'Wilkes Survey of Bingham is set within the exterior linE'~ 
of the McGuire & Company Placer. And by the same 
token when taxes are aRsessed against said Lot 10, Block 
4, and are also assessed against the placer ground, in so 
far as one area is embraced within the other. that same 
area has necessarily been taxed twice-once under the lot 
and block description and again under the name of the 
mining claim. 
The facts in the case come squarely within the rule 
announced by the Supreme Court in the case of Ri•• 
Grande Vv estern Railway Company v. Salt Lake Invest-
ment Company, 35 Utah 528, 101 Pac. 586, where Judgr 
Frick says: 
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"If the County Assessor had assessed Lot 8 
by one de:,;cription to appellant as claimant, and 
by another, or by the same description to respond-
ent as owner, it would then be a case of assessing 
the same property to two claimants, either one of 
whom could have paid the taxes. Under such cir-
cumstances, the question would arise as to which 
one of the claimants, in contemplation of law, had 
pai.d the taxes. The authorities, under such cir-
cumstances, are to the effect that the one who 
pays first is to be deemed as having paid the taxes 
for the purpose of acquiring title by adverse pos-
session.'' 
'rhe evidenee as to the dates of payments of taX('S 
assessed against Lot 10, Block 4, and the l'deGuire & Com-
pany Placer is as follows: 
Lot 10, Block 4 
Plat" A", Bingham 
McGuire & Company 
Placer Claim. 
Taxes for Year Date Paid Date Paid 
1904 Nov. 12, 1904 
1905 Nov. 14, 1905 
1906 Nov. 14,1906 
1907 Nov. 14,1907 
1908 Oct. 21, 1908 
1909 Nov. 3, 1909 
1910 Oct. 22, 1910 
1911 Nov. 8, 1911 
1912 Oct. 17, 1912 
1913 Nov. 1, 1913 
1914 Nov. 5, 1914 
1915 Oct. 19, 1915 
1916 Nov. 17, 1916 
1917 Sept. 28, 1917 
1918 Sept. 16, 1918 
1919 Oct. 10, 1919 
Nov. 4, 1904. 
Oct. 18, 1905. 
Oct. 23, 1906. 
Nov. 9, 1907. 
Sept. 22, 1908. 
Nov. 6, 1909. 
Nov. 8, 1910. 
Oct. 23, 1911 
Nov. 1, 1912. 
Nov. 10, 1913. 
Nov. 2, 1914. 
Oct. 14, 1915. 
Nov. 20, 1916. 
Nov. 6, 1917. 
Oct. 29, 1918. 
Sept. 24, 1919. 
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It is of eourse perfectly evident from the foreg-oing-
tabulation that it is impossible for the defendants to show 
any consecutive seven years wherein taxes on Lot 10~ 
Block 4, were paid before taxes for the same years were 
paid on the McGuire & Company Placer. So the defenHe 
of adverse possession must be resolved against the de-
fendants. 
It w!ll be remembered that in announcing its decisi0n 
the trial court said: 
"If the question in th~s case involved only the 
property rights acquired under the patents, the 
<'Ourt might be inclined to the opinion maintained 
by the plaintiffs, that is, that the placer patent re-
lated back to the original location and established 
priority, but the adverse possession on the part of 
the defendants is so clearly estabJished that the 
case must be determined on that question. 
Two cases have a1lready been tried and a p-
pealed to the Supreme Court and settled by that 
tribunal on this identical question and these have 
been cited in defendants' brief and are binding on 
this court.'' 
rrhe hvo cases referred to were cited to the trial comt 
by the respondents with nothing more than the following 
observation: 
"A citation of authority would not seem nec-
essary upon this phase of the ease and we content 
ourselves with a reference merely to the decisions' 
of the Supreme Court of Utah in the following 
cases: 
Utah Copper Co. v. Chandler, 45 Utah 85, 
142 Pac. 1119; 
Utah Copper Co. v. Eckman, 47 Utah 165, 
152 Pac. 178. 
The foregoing cases are rules of property in 
this jurisdiction upon which the defendants had a 
right to rely in their several purchases of the 
premises herein invO'lved.'' 
In view of the answer of the <lefendantb herein and 
in view of their motion for non-suit, not to mention nu-
merom; objeetions made during the course of the trial 
and the findings of fact, conclusions of law and judgme11t, 
it is not apparent why the doctrine of th~~ Chandler case 
applif::s to the issue..; in this case at all. 
The doctrine of the Chaudler case is stated by .Jus-
tice JTriek iu the ]<Jekman case as follows: 
"It is accordingly held in that case that, un-
der the statute, if a person is in actual and ad-
verse possession of the surface ground of a min-
ing claim for the poriml of time required by our 
statute, and has, during that time, improved the 
·surface under a claim of right, such person may be 
assessed with such surface area and the improve-
ments thereon, and that he may pay the taxes so 
assessed, and such payment will be sufficient to 
<>ntitle him to make a claim of adverse possession 
to such surface ground, together with the improve-
ments thereon, as against the owner of the mining 
claim, although the latter may also have paid the 
taxes on the mining claim as such and in accord-
anee with the fixed statutory valuation aforesaid, 
and may claim all the minerals beneath the sur-
faee. '' 
In the record mad<~ by the defendants in the present 
case, from one end of it to the other-from th<> answer of 
the defendants to the judgment which they persuaded tlw 
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trial court to sign and file-no mention whatever is made 
of a claim to the surface of a mining claim. In their 
answer they claim title in fee simple absolute to the en-
tire domain. In their motion for non-snit they insisted 
that the plaintiffs had failed to make a ease because plain-
tiffs' title was derived from the mineral patent whereas 
the defendants' title was derived from the agricultural 
patent and the latter they claimed gave a better title from 
original source. The findings and conclusions are to the 
same effect. In short, the judgment entered in this ease 
is intended to be and unless reversed will be res adjudi-
cata in favor of the defendants both as to the surface 
g;round and the subsurface ground, and that in face of 
the proof that the appellants paid all taxes levied and as-
sessed against the McGuire & Company Placer. \Ve can-
not believe that any such judgment can be permitted to 
stand except on the theory that the agricultural patent 
under which the respondents' elaim is a source of title 
paramount and superior to the title acquired under the 
mineral patent. 
If such a theory is pennitted to prevail, then of 
course the question of adverse possession is out of the 
case. If such a theory cannot be sustained then the judg·-
ment of the trial court awards to the respondents, under 
their plea of adverse possession, certain land admittedly 
assessed for taxation and on which the appellants paid 
taxes, at all material times, prior to the payment of taxes 
thereon by the respondents. 
The rule announced in the ease of Rio Grande \Vest-
em Raihvay Company Y. Salt Lake Investment Company, 
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35 Utah 528, ought to control the uecision of the present 
case. So far as adverse possession is concerned, this case 
is nothing more than one where land was assessed to two 
claimants, under different descriptions, and appellants 
paid taxes assessed to the appellants before the respond-
ents paid taxes assessed to the respondents. 
It may be conceded that the facts in the Chandler 
case are sui generis. Nevertheless, the decis~on is bot-
tomed upon elementary and long-established principles 
and is entirely sound. 
rrhe doctrine of Severance antedates the De0laration 
of Independence and is well established. 
"Although the owner of the surface is prima 
facie the owner of the minerals beneath the sur-
face, and a general conveyance of the land will 
carry the minerals, it is consistent with the nature 
and adaptation of mineral property that differ-
ent persons should own the surface and the un-
derlying minerals, and so the owner of land con-
taining minerals may segregate one from the 
other, by a conveyance or instrument in writing, 
so that there is a complete severance of title and 
separate estates are created." 
27 Cyc. 681. 
And the Supreme Court of California has said: 
''Such an absolute estate in an unde11lying 
stratum may he created and the estate of the owner 
of the overlying land and of the owner of the sub-
terranean stratum will be as distinct and sepa-
rate as is the ownership of respective owners of 
two adjoining tracts of land. For purposes of 
separate ownership, land may be divided horizon-
tally as ,,·ell as superficially and vertically." 
37 
Graeiosa Orl Company v. Santa Barbara 
County, 99 Pac. 483. 
On page 687 of the same Volume of Cyc. the text 
reads as follows: 
''After the mineral is conveyed a part from 
the land, or vice versa, two separate estates exist, 
each of which is distinct; the surface and the min-
eral right are then held by separate and distinct 
titles in severalty, and each is a freehold estate 
of inheritance separate from and independent of 
the other. Each estate may be conveyed by deed 
in the same manner as other real estate is con-
veyed, may be devised by will, may pass by inher-
itance, and is subject to taxation." 
Patent from the United States to the owners of a 
mining location vestB in the patentee title to the surface 
ground as well as to the minerals beneath. 
Original Consol. Mining Co. v. Abbott, 167 
Fed. 681. 
By the force and effc~ct of patent it,self, no severance 
of the claimed premises into a surface estate and a sub-
surface estate results, although the character of mining 
ground is such as to permit of such severance. The con-
ventional morle of effecting a severance is of course by 
deed, whereby the ovvner of tlw entire proprietor-
ship conveys the surfaee and n~serves the mm-
Prals with right to mme and extract the same 
or vice versa. But due process of law is satis-
fied if severance is accomplished by adverse pos-
session ·of the surface or of the minerals beneath; also 
by forfeiture for non-payment of taxes separately as-
sessed against th(' surface estate or against the subsur-
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face estate. Ho1vever, until severance there is only one 
e,state, and adverse possession of the surface draws with 
it the right to claim the subsurface. And in like manner 
a tax lPvied against the patented premises impresses its 
lien on both the surface and the subsurface as one C'state 
and a tax deed convey's to the purehaser at tax sale the 
entire proprietorship as one estate. 
To say that mineral lands can, in law and from their 
very characteristics, be divided into two estates, one a 
surface estate of free-hold and the other a free-hold es-
tate in the subsurface minerals, is not to say that there 
are necessarily two such esta t<•s in every parcel of min-
eral ground. On the contrary the two estates come into 
being only after severance has in some manner been 
made. Prior to severance mineral Janel is precisely the 
same as any other land. 
• '-Where theTe is no severance of the surface 
estate from the underlying mineral estate the or-
dinary rules of adverse possession of real estate 
apply, and the rule is that possession of the 
surface of mineral land is possession of all the 
underlying minerals. An adverse entry or posses-
sion of the surface extends downward and draws 
to it title to all the underlying minerals. 
"Until severance takes place" " " the 
owner's title rPaehes from the center to the sure 
face, and from the surface to the heavens; and 
with a grant of the land or an acquisition of title 
by an adverse holding the entire estate of the for-
mer owner passes. 
''The decisions. are unanimous in holding that 
-where the title to the mineral right has been sev-
ered from the title to the surface, possession of 
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the surface by its owne-r is not adverse to the own-
er of the mineral below it. The mineral owner 
does not lose his possession by any length of non-
user, and the surface owner cannot acquire title 
to the minerals by adverse possession based on his 
exclusive and continued occupancy of the surface 
alone.'' 
13 A. L. R. Note at pages 372, 375. 
While the authorities are agreed that prior to sev-
erance, possesgion of the Hurfane iH possesHion of the min-
erals, and thus adverse possession of the surface gives 
the adverse claimant the minerals as well, they are also 
agreed that after severance, two estates being then cre-
ated, possession ·of thP surfare is not possession of tlw 
minerals, and adverse possession of one estate does not 
Pntitle the claimant to the other. At the same time we 
fmd the text-writers announcing the rule that severance 
lllay be aecomplished hy adverse pnssession and that is 
doubtless true. But unless the case ·of Utah Copper Com-
pany v. Chandler, 45 Utah 85, so decides, we assert, after 
careful research, that there is no case in the reports 
where adverse claim to the surface effected that result. 
To the contrary every case cited in support of the doc--
trine that severance can be effected by adverse posses-
sion ·shows that the adverse possession therein was of 
the minerals. vVhy that should be is apparent. It is 
not likely that an adverse claimant would refuse t·o take 
all that his proof entitled him to demand. Since his ad-
Yerse possession of the ·surface entitles a claimant to 
both the surface and the minerals, it is not surprising to 
find in the decided cases no party to the litigation un-
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willing to take all the law gives him, and yet one can 
conceive that the contrary might be the case and no 
principle of law forbids it. However, there is a funda-
mental element of adverse possession that the posses-
sion of the claimant in order to be adverse should be 
such as to advise the owner of the claimant'.s claim. An-
other essential is that the claimant must show payment 
by himself of taxes levied and assessed against the land 
claimed. The adverse possession may be such as to ad-
'Vise the o\vner of the adverse claim, and yet, under the 
law, if the claimant does not pay all taxes assessed 
against the premises, the mvner may rest secure in his 
legal title, as,sured by the law that he can assert it and 
prevail at any time. 
The rule seems to he established that when one g'oes 
into possession of mineral ground under a deed purport-
ing to convey to him the entire proprietorship, from the 
surface to the center of the earth, that that is his claim 
and, in the absence of any showing to the contrary, that 
is the notice given to the record owner of the extent of 
the adverse claim. 
''In considering the question Whether Hyl-
ton ''s entry and possession was adversary and hos-
tile, the familiar principle must be borne in mind 
that when one enters upon land he is presumed to 
enter under the title which his deed purports upon 
its face to convey, both as to the boundary or ex-
tent of the land and the nature of his title. * * * 
From the first, he is presumed, indeed he is proved, 
to have claimed under his deed, and there is noth-
ing to show that he or those who claim under him 
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ever acknowledged that the title to the land was 
anything other than as it appeared upon the face 
of his deed. *, * * The evidence clearly shows 
that Hylton was in the exclusive possession of the 
land from the year 1877, when he entered under 
the conveyance of that date, claiming title to the 
whole tract in fee, until the institution of this suit, 
a period of thirty years or more. He paid taxes 
on it throughout these years as the fee simple 
owner; resided upon it the greater portion of the 
time; mined coal for his domestic purposes and 
small quantities for sale. \Vhether his coal oper-
ations during that period would have been suffi-
cieirt to have given him title to the coal if the min-
eral interest had been severed from the surface 
need not be considered, since, as we have seen 
there was no such severance; but unquestionably 
his acts of adversary possession were sufficient 
to creat(~ in him a complete title to the land in fee, 
mineral as well as surface, for his deed covered 
both.'' 
Virginia C. & I. Co. v. Hylton, 79 S. E. 337. 
''Everything in this ease indicates that Rich-
l!lond took possesHion under his deed as an adver-
sary claimant, under a claim of title to the whole 
tract of 96 acres in fee. * * * Admittedly in 
possession of the surface from February 21, 1891, 
Richmond is presumed to have entered, in the ab-
sence of anything to the contrary (and there is 
nothing to the contrary) under a claim of title to 
the \Vhole fee. There is nothing to show that he, 
or those who claimed under him, ever acknowl-
edged that his title to the land was other than it 
appeared upon the face of his deed. Indeed Rich-
mond's conduct throughout indicated a purpose to 
claim and exen·ise all the rights that a deed pur-
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porting to convey the fee in the whole tract, ac-
companied by possession and control of the area 
within his boundaries would afford. * * * Thjs 
court is of opinion upon the law and the facts of 
this case, that Richmond's entry upon the 96-acre 
tract was adversary and hostile, with full intent 
to claim and exercise against all parties all the 
rights of an owner in fee with respect to the sur-~ 
face and subsurface of the land purchased from 
Chisenhall. vV e are further of the opinion that 
he entered upon this 11and under the title that his 
deed purported to convey, both as to the boundary 
and extent of his land and the nature of his title, 
and that neither he or those claiming under him 
have ever acknowledged that the title to the land 
was anything other than it appeared upon the face 
of the deed, but have continued to hold the entire 
tract adversely. This adverse holding by Rich-
mond continued for a far greater length of time 
than was necessary under the statute to establish 
a complete title to the land in fee, both a1s to the 
surface and the minerals, for his deed covered 
both.'' 
Virginia C. & I. Go. v. Richmond, 104 S. E. 
805. 
On the other hand it is obvious that when a claimant 
takes posset~sion of the minerals, as distinguished from 
the surface, his po·sscssion, if sufficient to be termed 
"adverse," must in the n?ry nature of things fully inform 
the owner of his claim. 
If an advPn~e claimant drives a tunnel or siiJks a 
shaft and extraets ·ores, anyone can see it, and the owner 
is bound to take notice of suC'h activities. As appears 
from tlw decided cases, cited in the exhaustive note in 
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13 A. L. R., pages 372-383, adverse possession of the sub-
surface estate has been frequently claimed and sustained. 
The thoroughness of the editorial staff of the Lawyers' 
Co-op, when it undertakes to collect the authorities into a 
note on a chosen subject is, we believe, conceded by the 
profession today. Is it not noteworthy, that when deal-
ing with the subject of adverse possession of surface and 
subsurface estates there is no group of case's dealing with 
adverse possession of the surface alone albeit there is a 
large group dealing with adverse possession of the sub-
surface estate. 
And so it is safe to say that the facts in the Chandler 
case are unique. The facts in that case ·were stipulated 
between the parties and it was expressly .agreed that the 
adverse claimant went into possession of the surface only, 
made claim to the surface only and maintained adverse 
possession of the surface only, and expressly disclaimed 
any interest in the minerals or subsurface estate. 
The Chandler Case was decided in 1914. A year 
later the case of Utah Copper Co. v. Eckman, 47 Utah 165, 
came on for decision by the Supreme Court, and it has 
been urged that the Eckman Case holds, that if the proof 
sho·ws that the mining claim was assessed to its owner as 
so many acres of ground at the price per acre paid to the 
government therefor and further shows that the surface 
had an independent value and use then the doctrine of 
the Chandler Case applies. Our ans\ver to that is that 
the proof in the Eckman Case, in that respect, was pre-
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cisely the same as the proof in the case at bar, and never-
theless and notwithstanding the proof was held insuffici-
ent to sustain the claim of adverse possession. 
vV e quote from the judgment roll in the Eckman Case 
as it was filed in the Supreme Court: 
''MR. PARSONS: vV e offer in evidence 
plaintiff's exhibits C, D, E, F, G, H and I, being 
the tax receipts upon the Mirror Lode Mining 
Claim for the years 1903, to 1910, inclusive.'' 
Each and all of said exhibits read the same ex-' 
cept rus to the amount of the tax for the several 
years. Thus: 
''Property assessed to L. M. Byers. 
Description :-Mirror Mining Claim No. 
2890~ No. of Acres, 18.73. West Moun-
tain. 
Assessed value :'-$95.00. '' 
Total tax: 
1903-$1.86. 
1904- 2.43. 
1905- 2.08. 
1906- Sold for taxes. 
1907- Sold for taxes. 
1908- 2.27. 
1909- 2.56. 
1910- 2.56. 
The rebuttal argument is that the evidence was t,o 
be sure just as quoted, but the Eckman Case was reversed 
it is claimed because the trial court made no finding that 
the Mirror lode mining e]ajm had been assessed merely 
at $5.00 per acre. 
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At every term of the Supreme Court during the past 
twenty years, at least once and often many times, the 
court has announced the rule, that by positive. statutory 
enactment it must disregard any error which does not 
affect the substantial rights of the parties.. Accordingly 
it was held in Snyder v. Allen, 51 Utah 291, that while 
it was error for the trial court to fail to make a. certain 
finding, yet when the evidence sho'\ved that no finding 
would have been permissible other than in support of the 
jndpmmt, the judgment could not be reversed. Ag;ain in 
Sheppick v. Sheppick. 44 Utah 131, the court said: 
".While the court perhaps should have made 
a finding upon the issue of adverse possession, yet, 
in view that no finding except one adverse to the 
defendant's contention was permis,sible under all 
the evidence, the error, if any was committed, was 
immaterial, and hence without prejudice.'' 
It is difficult for us to believe that the Supreme 
Court reversed the Eckman Case because the trial court 
failed to find that the Mirror Lode was assessed merely 
at $3.00 per acre, when in the reeord then before it the 
tax receipts, introduced in evidence, showed precisely 
what was the fact of the matter and no other finding 
\nmld have been permissible. 
On the contrary, it seems clear both from the form 
and substance of the opinion that it was the fact that it 
was impossible to ascertain either from the pleadings, 
the proof or the findings whether Eckman claimed the 
surface only or the entire domain that caused the re-
versal. Expressly for that reason the opinion quotes 
Eckman's counter-claim and the court's findings in full. 
In terms Eckman claimed by his counter-claim fee simple 
title. At the same time he traced his title back to "one 
R. S. Julian," as distinguished from some pa:ramoun t 
source. In the very nature of severance, when the two 
estates come first into being at that time each estate initi-
ates in some individual as distinguished from sovereignty. 
It was and is fairly inferable from Eckman's pleading 
that he claimed that there had been a severance in Juli-
an's time and that a surface estate initiated with Julian. 
\Ve find re-inforcement of our position, viz: that, un-
der the law as heretofore announced by the Supreme 
Court, the adverse daim must be to the surface alone in 
order to have the doctrine of the Chandler Case apply, 
by the further circumstance that in that case the rule was 
announced and applied that the adverse claimant need 
not show payment ,of taxes, if none were lawfully as-
sessed. 
Let us suppose that a trespasser goeH into posst>ssiou 
of a portion of a mining claim, fences a lot and erects a 
cabin. His contention would be that by reason of his pos-
session ,of the surface he was possessed of tht~ subsurface 
as well. rt'he answer of the owner of tlw mining claim 
would be that the mining claim as such had been assessed 
to him and he had paid tlw taxes, henc(~ the adverse claim-
ant could not succeed. vV e do not believe the doctrine of 
the Chandler Case allows the adverse claimant to reply, 
vVell then, in that ease, all I now claim is the surface. No 
taxes have been assessed against the surface, hence I am 
entitled to the surface at least in any event. 
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If the locus in the case just supposed were non-min-
eral ground, we are confident that the adverse claiipant 
vvould not be permitted to prevail upon any such theory 
as the one suggestPd. 'L'wo elementary rules apply to de-
feat such a theory. In adverse possession it is necessary 
that the claimant make claim to the entire title. If his 
claim is for less than the fee, he in effect recogni:1;es a 
:paramount title. Again his possession must be "exclu-
sive." 'rwo persons cannot hold the same property ad-
versf~ly to each otl!cr at the same time. There can be 
no disseisin unless the rightful owner is altogether de-
priwd of possession. 
''The claim must be of title or ownership in 
fee, and to be of any avail must be to the entire 
title, not simply to a part of it." 
2 Corpus Juris, ''Adverse Possession,'' Sec. 
218, page 129. 
"However much the courts may disagree in 
respect of exclusiveness as an element of advers~. 
possession, there is no, nor can there be, dissent 
from the proposition that a possession of the ad-
verse claimant in conunon with the rightful owner 
is fatally wanting in exclusiveness and can never 
ripen into title by adverse possession.'' 
2 Corpus Juris, ''Adverse Possession,'' Sec. 
199, page 120. 
vVhat then is the difference between mineral and non-
mineral land 1 To say that the fonncr permits of seve ranee 
is merely begging the question. To say that the fact that 
the statute permits of separate taxation cannot be the 
answer, beeause the Chandler Case holds that it is im-
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material ·whether the ~mrfaec-> is taxeLl or not. 'ro say 
that it is the use of the surface for other than mining 
purposes which works the severance cannot be true be-
cause the record owner of the mining claim may himself 
mine the mineral:,; beneath and use the surface for a sheep 
corral, tlms subjecting the surface to a tax, and no sev-
erance results any more than a fee simple title can be 
said to be a life estate in the o·wner with remainder over 
to his heirs. 
Inevitably we are forced to tlw eo11clusion that it is 
the adverse "claim" to the surface which is the hasis of 
adverse possession of the surface. And that is doing no 
more than applying the principle that "intent" is a fac-
tor in adverse possession and must he provE>d as part of 
the claimant's case. Thus, the entry in the first plare 
may be without claim of title, and from the time and only 
from the time the claimant makes his <·laim hostilte cl.oes 
it bPcome adverse. 
At this time perhaps something should be said con-
cerning the so-called ·wilkes Survey of Bingham. In the 
Rckman case the opinion recites: "It appears from the 
evidenee that the :,;urface area in dispute has for many 
years been platted into town lots." 
vVhatever the evi<lence may have been in that respE>ct 
m the Eckman case, there is no such evidence in the 
instant record. If that bPcornes a material factor in this 
case, it was incumbent on the defen<lants to make the rec-
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ord under their plea of adverse possession. We submit 
with a good deal of confidence that the court cannot take 
judicial notice of the -Wilkes Survey or of its history or 
of its force and effect. "\Ve say that because our own de-
iberate inquiry into the matter has failed to enlighten 
us. It may be conceded that in 1900 Chas. S. Wilkes was 
County Surveyor of Salt Lake County and that as such 
he made a survey of Bingham Canyon, that he platted 
his notes and submitted the resulting plat to the County 
Commissi,oners who approved the same in 1904 and or-
dered the map filed in the Recorder's Office, where it 
hangs to this day. It is evident that since that time trans-
fers ,of real estate have been made, using the Wilkes 
plat for purposes of dPscription. It is also evident that 
the County Assessor has made similar use of it. But it 
does not appear that the -Wilkes Survey was any act of 
the property owners themselves or that it affects or pur-
ports to affect titles in any way. In short, from all that 
appears its force and effect is precisely the same as the 
act of the government of Salt Lake City in dividing its 
territory into wards and voting districts. Even if it 
·were competent to attempt such a thing, there is nothing 
from which the inference can he drawn that the Wilkes 
Survey purports to deal with surface area only. To 
the contrary the proof or -offer ·of proof shows that the 
-Wilkes Survey has been used by all parties, vendors and 
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Yendees, mortgagors and mortgaget~s and the Yarious 
county assessors and treas urcrs precisely the same as, 
for instance, Salt Lake City Survey. Although the 
-Wilkes Survey may be useJ for purposes of description 
yet whenever a surface estate is intended apt words of 
severance must be used to aeeomplish the purpose. In 
any event the burden of proof was upon the defendants 
and if the record is lacking it is their concern. 
But the defendants did not concPrn themselves with 
that matter because tht>y did not claim the surface es-
tate of a mining claim. To the contrary, they claimed 
title to non-mineral ground "in fee simple abg.olute ex-
elusive of any other right," and in support of that claim 
eontended that the Bentley patent was the superior title, 
that inasmuch as the proof showed title in them by mesne 
eonveyances from Bentley, they should prevail. 
In this state county assessors are not judicial of-
ficers. No one can say, until this present case is decided 
by the Supreme Court, whether the Bentley patent cov-
ered the demanded premises or whether it is a part of a 
mining claim. 
This reeord shows that two patents issued from the 
United States covering the demanded premises-one a 
mineral patent and the other an agricultural patent of an 
earlier date. If the agricultural patent was paramount, 
then no question of surface and sub-surface estates en-
tered in. It was the assessor's duty to assess the prem-
ises claimed as agricultural ground thf~ same as other ag-
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ricultural ground, and he~ did just that. The Bentiey pat-
ent called for the west half of the east half of the north-
west quarter of Section 26. The record shows (proof in-
troduced by the defendants) that the assessor assessed 
that acreage as described in the patent until the 'Wilkes 
Survey was approved in 1904. Thereafter he assessed 
that acreage as theretofore but ''excepting the land in-
cluded in the Bingham Plats." 
\V e submit that there is no opportunity in this case 
to contend that the adverse claim was to the surface ·of 
a mining claim. 'ro the contrary the rule controlling 
this case is the rule announced in Rio Grande Ry. v. S. 
L. Investment Co., supra. And all that is said in the 
opinion in that case respecting the jurisdietion of county 
assessors and the State Board applies in the case at bar. 
By the Act of March 11, 1909, it is made the duty of 
the State Board of Equalization to ''assess * * * all 
property and surface improvements, upon or appurte-
uaut to mines and mining claims, which have a value sep-
arate and independent of all such mines and mining 
claims. As soon as sueh as;;;essment is completed a copy 
of same must be furni slwd to the owner." 
Laws 1909, page 96. 
And by the amendnJPnt of March 21, 1919, the follow-
ing language was added to the foregoing ''and the value 
·of auy surface use made of * ~· * mining property 
for othE>r than mining purposes." 
\Yhenever it becomes material to show that tlw im-
provements or surface use of a mining claim have been 
separately assessed, there is no lack of proof. The only 
pmwr to assess that particular property is now lodged in 
the State Board. County assessors since 1909 at least 
have no such powPr, and by the same token the State 
Board could not assess the ·west half of the east half of 
the northwest quarter of Section 26, nor any part of it. 
If that was assessed, it must have been the work of the 
County Assessor, and that is precisely what the proof 
shows. And so it is that tlw opinion in the Eckman CasP 
says: 
"While it is quite clear that in this case the 
surface area of the Mirror lode mining claim 
* * * was used and improved by the defendant 
for other than mining purposes and that such sur-
face area and im.provements had a value separate 
and distinct from said mining claim as such, yet 
it does not appear that in assessing that mining 
claim to appellant, who held the legal title there-
of, it wws not assessed to it for all purposes; that 
is, for the purpose of a mining claim and also for 
such other purposes as the surface thereof was de-
voted to.'' 
'l'here ean be no donbt about it that auy official 
clmrged with the duty of assessing the McGuire Placer 
as a mining claim and its surface ind<~pendently could 
luwe aseertained the names of its owners. 
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Section 5915, C. L. 1917, provides: 
''Lands once described on the assessment hook 
need not be described a second time, but any per-
son claiming the same and desiring to be assessed 
therefor may have his name inserted with that of 
the person to whom such land is assessed.'' 
Throughout the Hevenue Laws it is dear that it is 
intended that the owner of property should be advised 
of all taxes assess(~d against his property, either by actual. 
·uotiee or that au examination of the reeords would reveal 
the faetf.;. 
lu .:\linnesota a statute provided for the se>parnt<' 
taxation of subsurface and surface estates, and the eond 
said: 
''Manifestly it would have been easy to de-
scribe the property taxed as 'Mineral rights' as it 
would have been to describe it as 'Surface rights.' 
The description used does neither, but is merely 
the governmental description. The interest of the 
plaintiff in the minerals was plainly real estate, 
and properly taxable separately. The law direct-
ed the asse,ssing officers to tax it separately. If 
the separate interest of the mineral owner is eov-
ered by this description, the result is that his prop-
erty is taxed without notice to him, under the 
guise of taxing the property of another. The 
courts do not favor 1such a result. It does not 
seem important that the mineral estate may have 
escaped taxation. That the assessor omitted to 
assess this interest does not influence the decision 
in the pn•sent case.'' 
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·washburn v. Gregory Company, 147 N. W. 
706. 
And that seems to be the intent of the legislature in 
amending Section 5864 as they did after the Eckman 
Case was decided, Laws of Utah, 1919, page 319: 
''All metalliferous mines or mining claims 
both placer and rock in place shall be assessed at 
$5.00 per acre. * *' * The value of any sur-
face use made of mining claims or mining prop-
erty for other than mining purposes shaH be as-
sessed at full value. * * * In all cases where 
the surface of lands is owned by one person and 
the mineral underlying such lands is owned by 
another, such property rights shall be separately 
asses1sed to the respective owners.'' 
Again throughout the Revenue Laws, from the time 
the Constitution was adopted, the taxation of mines and 
mining properties has been separately treated in the laws 
of Utah. Thus in the Assessment Book, ''Mines and 
mining claims by name and lot number," are accorded 
a separate column. C. L. Section 5909. Again, Section 
5916 requires the State Board to supply the several coun-
ty assessors with a list of all patented mining claims. In 
the case at bar no claim was made to the surface of a min-
ing claim; much less was any claim made that the surface 
of a mining claim had a ''separate and independent 
value" and was either assessed accordingly or that no 
taxes were assessed against it. We submit that no one 
can ascertain whether or not the -surfaee of a mining 
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claim has been separately assessed without finding the 
information desired in the separate column of the Assess-
ment Book, ·where it ought to be listed. So far as that 
is concerned the proof in the instant case is precisely the 
same as it "\vas in the Eckman Case, and as Mr. Justice 
Frick observed: "It does not appear that in assessing 
that mining- claim * * * it was not assessed for all 
purposes; that is for the purpose of a mining- claim and 
also for such other purposes as the surface thereof was 
devoted to." Indeed, from the decision in Ontario Sil-
ver Min. Co. v. Hixon, 49 Utah 359, it is apparent that 
g-ood men are apt to differ as to what constitutes "a sep-
arate and independent value." It is for the assessor to 
decide in the first place and for the courts to review in 
a proper case his decision. If, as a matter of law, the 
assessor makes a mistake, either in determining that the 
surface of a mining claim has a separate and independ-
ent value or in determining that it has not, that is no 
sound reason why the owner of a patented mining claim 
should lose his surface rights on the theory adopted by 
an adverse claimant that no taxes were assessed against 
the surface, when they ought to have been so assessed; 
unless the adverse claimant can bring his case squarely 
within the facts of the Candler Case. 
It will be remembered that the acreage of the Mc-
Guire Placer is 11.79. Until the amendment of 1919 
placer mining claims were assessed at the priee per acre 
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paid to the government, or $2.30 per acre. After that 
time the value was placed arbitrarily at $5.00 per acre for 
all mining claims. For a number of years prior to 1919 
the McGuire was assessed at $30.00, but periodically the 
assessor changed that valuation to $60.00 and again to 
$55.00. 'Ve suppose for his purpose the assessor treated 
the 11.79 acres as 12 acres, and that the value of $30.00 
was reached by multiplying 12 by $2.50 and the value 
of $60.00 by mutiplying 12 by $5.00. In any event the 
assessed valuation was, strietly speaking, always more 
than the statutory rate for a mining claim as such. Even 
in 1916, when it ''·Tas valued at ~~55.00, that was before 
the amendment of 1919. To argue that the excess may 
include a surface value is not appealing to appellants' 
counsel. The circumstance is mentioned simply because 
the trial court referred to it in deciding the case. 
III. 
AS TO THE CLAIM OF E.STOPPEL. 
There is no evidence whatever in the record and in-
deed no claim is made that either of the plaintiffs or any 
of their co-tenants in the McGuire & Company Placer 
ever by word or act made any representation of any kind 
to the defendants or to their predecessors in interest ·with 
relation to the placer title. There is no assertion that 
the owners of thr placer at any time knevv about any of 
the tram;fers in <lefendants' allegPd chain of title or that 
they were conscious of the fact that any improvements 
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of any kind ·were about to be placed upon the ground 
before they were completed, until perhaps Michael Gib-
bons saw certain construction going on in late September, 
1924. It appears from the defendants' answer that in 
that month structures which had theretofore been on the 
premises were destroyed by fire and that thereupon the 
Utah Copper Company, having acquired an alleged title 
to the ground, commenced building a hospital on about the 
23rd day of September, 1924, and that the construction 
·was completed on the lOth day of April, 1925, at a cost 
of about $23,000.00. It also appears, however, from the 
answer that on the 30th day of October, 1924, and prior 
to thE' time that any conveyance was placed of record 
from R. G. Frazier to the Utah Copper Company, the 
plaintiff served a notice on Frazier protesting against the 
erection of any building, and asserted the placer title. It 
is apparent from the answer that this notice was received 
within about a week after the first acts were done upon 
the ground indicating that any one intended to build a 
building thereon. 
It further appears from the evidence that the notice 
of the location of the McGuire & Company Placer was 
recorded in the Lower Placer Mining District of Salt 
Lake County on the 26th day of October, 1875, and in 
the Office of the County Recorder on the 13th day of 
February, 1880, and that the patent was recorded in the 
Office of the County Recorder June 12, 1897. The first 
conveyance in the d(~fendants' alleged chain of title was 
that of one S. S. Maxwell to F. E. Straup, which bore 
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date the 16th day of -:\fay, lS99. Both the aus\ver and 
the testimony show that 'Whatever possession Max\vell 
took of the ground and whatever improvements he erected 
thereon were made long subsequent to the recording of 
the location notice in the Office of the County Recorder. 
To summarize, we have a case then where it is 
claimed, that an owner of ground, claiming under instru-
ments which were at all times duly recorded in the Office 
of the County Rocorcler of the county wherein the land 
lay, is estopped by reason of the fact that conveyances 
of which he knew nothing in advance passed between 
third parties, who so far as the record shows \Vere strang-
ers to him, and because trespassers upon his ground 
erected improvements thereon, although it does not ap-
pear that he knew in advance that they intended so to 
do or that he knew what was going on during the process 
of building until finally some improvements were eoin-
menced of which he did have knowledge, whereupon he 
protested. It must be remembered that in this case there 
is no claim whatever that the plaintiff1s or any of their 
(~o-tenants by any representations or act or deed of theirs 
ever at any time misled anyone in the defendants' chain 
of title or that the owners of the placer ever did anything 
in an affirmative way to encourage the conveyances or the 
erection of the improvements. 
~We respectfully submit that under such circmn-
stances as these, no estoppel arises. 
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The defendants and their predecessors in interest are 
charged under our law with knowledge of the plaintiffs' 
title by n~ason of the fact that the instruments under 
which the plaintiffs claimed were at all times of record. 
Section 4900 of the Compiled Laws of Utah, 1917, rea(h; 
as follows: 
"Every conveyance or illlstrument in writing 
affecting real estate executed, acknowledged, or 
proved, and certified in t~e manner prescribed by 
this title, and every patent to lands within this 
:,;tate duly executed and verified according to law, 
and every judgment, order, or decree of any court 
of record in this state, or a copy thereof, required 
by law to be recorded in the office of the county 
recorder, shall, from the time ·of filing the same 
with the recorder for record, impart notice to all 
persons of the contents thereof, and subsequent 
purchasers, mortgagees, and lien-holders shall be 
deemed to purchase and take with notice." 
Every person vvho is alleged by the defendants to 
have erected any substantial improvements on this 
ground claims to have purchased after the record of the 
McGuire title. It follows therefore that under the stat-
ute the defendants and each of the predecessors was 
charged with knowledge of the frailties of his own title 
and the existence of the title to the McGuire. The Su-
preme Court of Utah, in Poynter v. Chipman, 8 Utah 442, 
at page 451, says: 
GO 
"* * '~ 'I'he princi1)le invoh:od by this re-
quest is that one should be estopped from assert-
ing a right to property upon which he has, by his 
own conduct, misled another, who supposed him-
self to be the owner, or to have a right to make 
expenditures thereon. 'But this salutary princi-
ple cannot be invoked by one who, at the time the 
improvements were made, was acquainted ·with tho 
true character of his own ti.tle, or with the fact that 
he had none.' Brant v. Iron Co., 93 U.S. 326; Hen-
shaw v. Bissell, 18 \Vall. 255; Steel v. Refining 
Co., 106 U. S. 45G, 1 Sup. Ct. Rep. 389. It cannot 
be contomle<l that the defendent did not know all 
aLout the title to the land at this time. *" 
Tlw Supreme Conrt in \Vis<>r v. Lawler, 189 li. ~:). 
:2GO, 23 Sup. Ct. H<~p. 624, nso;-; tlw follow in~~· lang;m1~e: 
"But, conceding defendants to have been ap-
prised of the contents of the prospectus, it would 
eertainly be an exceptional case if a person hold-
ing a deed of property which he has placed upon 
record would ho bound to disclose his title ~v a 
person contemplating pmchasing or making im-
provements upon the land, or would be estopped 
from making his claim thereto by mere silence, 
sine<:> he has a right to rely upon the constructive 
notice giv<>n hy the record; although the rule would 
he othen,·is<~ in ease of positive misrepresenta-
tions upon his part. Brant v. Virginia Ooal & I. 
Co., 93 U. S. 32G, 337, 23 L. Ed. 927, 929; Knouff 
v. Thompson, 1 6 Pa. 357; Brinckerhoff v. Lansing, 
4 .T olms. Ch. 65, 8 Am. Dec. 538; Rico v. Dewey. 
54 Barb. 455; King-man v. Graham, 51 \Vis. 232, 
8 N. \V. 181; Sulphine v. Dunbar, 55 Miss. 255; 
Port(~r v. ·wheeler, 105 Ala. 451, 17 So. 221. The 
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authoritieR also recogmr.e a distinction between 
mere silence and a deceptive silence accompanied 
by an intention to defraud, which amounts to a 
poHitive beguilement. Sumner v. Seaton, 47 N.J. 
Eq. 103, 19 Atl. 884; Hill v. Epley, 31 Pa. 331; 
l\larklmm v. 0 'Connor, 52 Ga. 183, 21 Am. Rep. 
2"19. 
'' * * *:' It cannot bo that A would be 
estopped by silence with respect to his title to 
property which B is about to purchae.e, when he 
has no knowledge that B contemplates buying and 
B has no knowledge that A is connected with the 
vroperty. \V c know of no case holding that a man 
is (•stopped by silmce as against the public, or any 
particular person with whom he has no fiduciary 
l'Plation." 
'I'll(' rule is j)]'Operly amJotmecd in 10 R. C. L. at pa~~·p 
W:J, as follows: 
'';X! 
* And where the foundation for a 
claimed estoppel is silence or omission to give no-
tice of one's rights, the party relying thereon must 
not have had the means of knowing the true· state 
of facts, as by reference to the public records; 
estoppel by silence differing, apparently, in this 
respect from the class of estoppels resulting from 
affirmative acts or conduct.'' 
''A public record is an available means of in-
formation as to questions of title, and one who 
(!oos not tah:e advantage of it cannot claim an 
estoppel against one who merely fails to furnish 
sueh information. And it has been held that he 
\\'ill not be estopped by his si l<~nce, although he 
may know or be informed tbat others are nego-
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tiating for rights and interest's in property bound 
by his title of record, as he is under no obligation 
to warn or apprise them of that which the record 
discloses, but there is authority to the contrary.'' 
21 Corpus Juris 1130. 
~While it is there said that there is authority to th(• 
contrary, it will be readily seen that the vast weight of 
the decided cases is in accordance with the plaintiff's 
position. Furthermore, one of the cases cited to the con-
trary is properly interpreted by the Supreme Court of the 
United States in the case of \Viser v. Lawler, supra. 
The only other case cited to the contrary is that of Kmg-
man v. Graham, 8 N. \V. 181. In that case, however, the 
court uses the following language: 
"* " " No one, however, is under any ob-
ligation to exercise care or diligence to prevent 
another ',s being defrauded in a transaction to 
whieh he is not a party. In this class of cases a 
person is estopped because he has not spoken 
when he ought to have spoken. The duty to speak 
rests upon the knowledge that another is about to 
act in ignorance of the truth. Thus, where the 
title has been duly recorded, it may fairly be pre-
sumed that subsequent purchasers have used the 
means pointed out by law and acquired all the 
knowledge which it is important for them to have, 
or that they will do so. When, however, the owner 
is directly apprised of the ignorance of the buyer, 
and of his purpose to act in such ignorance, he 
cannot claim the benefit of this principle, because 
good faith then requires him to speak.'' 
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It can scarcely be contended that the defendants have 
brought themselves even to the most remote degree with-
in any of these rules. 
In the case of St. Louis Smelting & Refining Com-
pany v. Green, 13 Feel. 208, the court held that the party 
to vvhom the alleged representations were made must he 
ignorant of the truth, and that in view of the fact that 
the person against whom the estoppel was af3serted had 
in the course of proceedings for a patent of a mining 
claim given notice as required by law of his application 
for patent, it could not be said that he had stood by with-
out giving notice. In the case at bar the person against 
whom the estoppel is asserted not only gave notice of his 
claim of title but he gave that notice in accordance with 
the recording acts and in such a way that the defendants 
and none of their predecessors in interest will be heard 
in any court to deny that they knew so much about the 
plaintiffs' title as the plaintiffs themselves knew. 
Moreover, in the case of St. Louis Smelting & Refin-
ing Company v. Green, supra, the court used the follow-
ing language: 
"Assuming, however, that for the purpose of 
this decision the defendants did stand in the rela-
tion .of owners of th~s land at the time, I do not 
think this principle of the law of estoppel can be 
earried so far as to hold that even the owner of 
real estate who stands by and sees another make 
improvements upon it, and makes no objection, is 
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thereby estopped thereafter to claim the title of 
the real estate; he may be estopped to claim the 
improvements, but I do not think that he is 
estopped to claim the title in an action of eject-
ment.'' 
This brings us aptly to the consideration of another 
phase of the matter. It is claimed that there is now upon 
the ground a hospital erected at a cost of $23,000.00 or 
thereabouts by the defendant, Utah Copper Company, 
in all good faith and relying upon its title to the g-round. 
If the effect of the plaintiffs' action could be to take im-
provements of great value erected innocently and in good 
faith away from the defendants and give them to the 
plaintiffs, then we can readily imagine that a court would 
be very reluctant to enter such a judgment. Time and 
again our own Supreme Court and the courts of other 
jurisdictions and text writers have adverted to the fact 
that in order to create such an estoppel the person assert-
ing it must have acted upon the representations to his in-
jury. ~Without the injury, the estoppel does not arise. 
Brigham Young Trust Co. v. Wagener, 12 Utah 1, at 
page 11. Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence, 4th Edition, 
page 1642, also page 1645. 21 C. J. 1135. 
Under the laws of this state, the so-called occupying 
claimant's act (Compiled Laws, Utah, 1917, Sections 5031 
to 5035) will give to the defendants a complete and ade-
quate reimbursement against any loss in case judgment 
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is entered against them if it is found they acted on good 
faith in the construction of their building. Of course the 
question of the Tights of the Utah Copper Company in 
this respect are not at this time before the court, but it 
will always have opportunity in a proper proceeding in-
stituted in due season to set up its claims in this particu-
lar. Fares v. Urban, 46 Utah 609, 151 Pac. 57. As no 
injury can befall defendants by reason of their expendi-
tures if madP in good faith there is no estoppel. 
Properly analyzed the position of the defendants 
seems to be this; that although they and all their prede-
cessors in interest, when they undertook to traffic with 
this land, to trespass upon it, to take it for their OWll uses 
and purposes all(} to do whatever they did do with rela-
tion to it, were charged with knowledge of the plaintiffs' 
right in the premises, they can nevertheless by the simple 
device of treating those rights as if they did not exist, 
fiually prevail upon a court to take the same attitude. 
'rhis as we have seen is not the law. 
Au abstract of title is in evidence here. It shows 
everything respecting the McGuire Placer that Dr. 
Straup, Dr. Castleman, Dr. Ray, Dr. Frazier and the Utah 
Copper Company could have seeu, if they had done what 
even the most simple minded citizen would have done, 
·when contemplating the purchase of real estate. Each 
and all of those witne"se>s fraukly ndmitted that, when 
he purchased, he d(•lilwrately "took a chance" on tho tith~. 
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None of them examined the records. And yet the trial 
court found in Conclusion No. III that these plaintiffs 
"ought not in equity be allowed to proceed against said 
defendants,'' 
Respectfully submitted, 
B. L. LIBERMAN, 
R. A. McBROOM, 
GEO. Y. vVALLACE, 
Attorneys for Appellants. 
